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Abstrak: Manajemen Risiko Finansial dalam Kontrak Syariah: Suatu
Tinjauan Literatur Mutakhir. Secara teori, sistem musyârakah, mudhârabah
dan murâbahah merupakan konsep kerja sama bisnis paling ideal. Musyârakah dan
mudhârabah merupakan kontrak bisnis yang telah dikenal sejak awal sejarah Muslim.
Musyârakah menempatkan para pihak pada posisi yang berimbang pada hak dan
kewajiban dalam bisnis sesuai proporsinya. Tulisan ini berusaha mengelaborasi
pandangan mutakhir tentang risiko keuangan dalam produk perbankan. Penulis
menyimpulkan bahwa pada praktik perbankan syariah, musyârakah dan mudhârabah
hanya menempati porsi yang kecil dibanding murâbahah. Dua produk tersebut
cenderung menimbulkan moral hazard dan adverse selection sehingga teori keagenan
dan asimetri informasi dapat memberikan penjelasan yang baik terhadap problem
musyârakah dan mudhârabah. Selain itu, konsep profit-loss sharing, berdasarkan
penelusuran penulis terhadap literatur kontemporer, juga masih kontroversial dan
konsep ini rentan terhadap penyimpangan moral.
Abstract: Theoretically, the musyârakah, mudhârabah and murâbahah systems
are the most ideal concept of profit loss sharing business. Musyârakah and mudhârabah
are business contracts recognized since the beginning of Islamic history. In Musyârakah
contract, each contracting parties are considered equal in their rights in doing
business contract. This writing attempts to elaborate the latest views on financial
risk in banking products. At the practical level, the writer concludes that musyârakah
and mudhârabah constitute minor portion than murâbahah in the overall Syari’ah
banking transactions. These products of Syari’ah banking tend to lead to moral
hazard and adverse selection and thus agency theory and information asymmetrical
explain the inherent problem well. In addition, the concept of profit-loss sharing
according to the writer is still controversial which is also vulnarable to moral hazard.
Keywords: risk management, Syariah banking, musyârakah, mudhârabah,
murâbahah
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Introduction
I attempt to evaluate the issues of financial risk management in Syariah financial
institutions. Syariah financial institutions have unique products, which are different from
conventional banking products. The main uniqueness of syariah product lies in its profit
loss sharing feature as opposed to interest or fixed rate contracts in conventional banking.
These differences bring in distinct consequences. I attempt to evaluate these consequences
through theoretical or conceptual and empirical approaches. There are various papers
discussing this issue. I attempt to review papers by Aggarwal and Yousef (2000), Febianto
(2012) for the conceptual approach, and papers by Boumediene (2011),Tafri, Rahman,
and  Omar (2011), Hutapea and Kasri (2010), Chong and Liu (2009) for the object of study.
This issue is of interest since mudaraba and musyaraka can be implemented well in
business by early Muslim generation. This point is supported by various narrated hadith.
This practice was implemented by prophet Muhammad when he has business contract
with Khadîjah – later on she became his first wife–, before he became the prophet.  Ulama
(Muslim clerics) agree and accept that musyaraka and mudaraba practices are forms of
business alliance or business cooperation. This conclusion is supported by the fact that
there are few controversies among Muslim scholars on this issue. Moreover, for mudaraba
contract, most ulamas agree that suppliers of the capital (stockholders or sahibu al-mal)
are not allowed to as for guarantee or collateral to businessman (mudarib).1 Business guarantee
in this context a trust. Guarantee other than a trust is not allowed. Guarantee from a
trust shows that mudaraba contract is built using principle of trust among stakeholders
and businessman. From various narrated hadith, there seem no agency conflicts among
business stakeholders. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that there seem no studies
on the agency conflicts and information asymmetry among business players in fiqh ulama
(clercks).2
Musyaraka and mudaraba (muqarada)can be accepted and implemented as a method
of business cooperation in early Islam history. Conceptually, musyaraka is the most ideal
business form, since musyaraka places business players in equal position in terms of their
rights and obligations. Mudaraba is a profit sharing contract, while musyaraka is a profit
Syafiq M. Hanafi: Financial Risk Management in Syariah Contracts
1Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 54.
2Phenomenon of information asymmetry is probably already known in prophet Muhammad
era. Prophet Muhammad prohibited transaction in the mid way to market, by stopping merchants
before they arrive in the market (talaqqi ruqban).The prohibition is based on an argument that
information possession is different between merchant and buyers. Merchants do not know yet
the newest information, while buyers already acquire the newest information. Possession of
new information by one party (buyers in this case) may create excessive profit, above normal
or natural level of profit, so the merchants are at a disadvantage. However, the study emphasizes
moral and ethical issues, rather than agency conflicts. Thus studies of agency conflicts is not
known in early Islamic business literature.
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and loss sharing contract. These two contracts are those based on syariah principles,
with fair or just participation among business players.3
Profit loss sharing is known as a basic operating concept in syariah banking, as an
opposite of interest based banking known in conventional banking. In reality, this concept
is not implemented successfully in syariah financial institutions. Proportions of contracts
with profit-loss sharing is low in syariah banking in all countries. I believe that syariah
banks experience implementation problems, since there is a trade-off between syariah
compliance and the interests of investors and bank depositors.4
I believe the contribution of this study will be of great importance in the novelty of
it’s discussion. Nonetheless, this paper does not mean to be exhaustive. The discussion
will begin with the characteristics of Syariah financial products as background study,
which then followed by section discussing conceptual approach, The main theme of the
paper will be discussed in the proceeding section which then concluded in the overall
study as well as its implication towards the Islamic economic studies.
The Nature of Islamic Law of Contracts
Islam prohibits riba. The definition of riba is still a controversial issue. Some scholars
believe that any kind of interest or rate of return fixed in advance is considered riba.
Other scholars argue that riba is usury in the sense that it places an excessive rate of
return. Thus interest rate may not be a riba, if interest rate is not excessive. Some other
scholars argue that interest rate for consumption credit shall be classified as riba, since
it puts heavy burden on the debtors who are usually in need of money.5 However, interest
rate for investment credit shall not be classified as riba, since the interest rate in this
context is a natural consequence of business contract. Although there is still ongoing
controversy over the definition of riba, most moslem scholars seem to agree that interest
is riba, hence it should be banned from any transaction.6
Syariah financial institutions attempt to institutionalize the prohibition of interest.
The purest form of financial contracts that abide the prohibition of interest is profit-loss
3Assem Safieddine, “Islamic Financial Institutions and Corporate Governance: New Insights
for Agency Theory,” in  Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(2), p. 144.
4Ibid,. p. 144.
5Saeed, Islamic Banking, p. 41-50.
6Wafica Ghoul, “Risk Management and Islamic Finance: Never the Twain Shall Meet?,”
in The Journal of Investing, Fall, 2008, p. 3. In Indonesia, the prohibition of riba was confirmed
by stipulation of MUI No. 1. Year 2004,  about Riba. The controversy whether bank interest is
a riba or not is still discussed in Fiqh study. The controversy classifies interest bank into three
categories: halâl (permitted), haram (prohibit), and subhat (probably better if we abandon).
Each category is supported by its arguments. Current Islamic economics which becomes a
operational reference for syariah financial institutions decides to opt out from the controversy
and decides that an addition to money is interest, and interest is riba, and riba is prohibited.
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sharing contracts. Howevere, Syariah financial institutions also offers various contracts
that are not as pure as profit-loss sharing contracts. Some scholars considered that these
other types of contracts are similar to debt or interest based contracts. Thus syariah financial
institutions offer Musyaraka, mudaraba, istisna’, salam, ijarah and murabahah as their
main contracts. Some scholars classify syariah contracts as no-debt creating and debt-
creating contracts.7 Example of non debt-creating contracts are musyaraka and mudaraba,
while other types of contracts can be classified as debt-creating contracts (Ijarah and murabahah
for example). Other scholars classify syariah financial contracts as original syariah contracts
as opposed to reshaped syariah financial contracts.8 Example of original financial contracts
are musyarkah and mudaraba, while example of reshaped syariah contracts are Ijarah
and murabahah.
Bank interest is prohibited on the ground that riba is not consistent with fairness
or just principle. Money is not a commodity that can be used to produce something (profit)
with interest mechanism. Another aspect prohibited by Islam is gharar or dubiousness,
which is considered business cheating or manipulation.  gharar creates uncertainty in business
transcation. Gharar also does not have legal consequences. Masyir or gambling is prohibited
on the ground that business gains profit in non-natural way, and with unrealistic expectation.9
In the next sub-section I review the main contracts for syariah financial institutions:
musyaraka, mudaraba, salam, ijarah, istisna, and murabahah. From this review, I will draw
some implications, particularly as related to the financial risk management of syariah
financial institutions.
Musyaraka and Mudaraba
Musyaraka and mudaraba10 are two types of contracts considered to be the purest
form of syariah financial contracts. Musyaraka and mudaraba offer partnership program
between syariah financial institutions and their counterparties. Musyaraka is derived
from business relation, which in Fiqh is called shirka al-amwal. A profit-loss haring has
to be defined in advance, before business starts. Profits are distributed after the actual
7Monzer Kahf, “Maqasid al Shari’ah in the Prohibition of Riba and Their Implications for
Modern Islamic Finance,” in Paper prepared for the IIUM International Conference on Maqasid
al Shari’ah, August 8-10, 2006, p. 7.
8M. T. Uthmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer Law International, The Hague.,
2002), p. 7.
9Md. Abdul Awwal Sarker, “Islamic Business Contracts, Agency Problem and the Theory
of the Islamic Firm,” in International Journal of Islamic Financial Services, Vol. I, No. 2, p. 1-2.
10The terminology of mudaraba was known in Iraq, mudaraba is contract between twoo
parties  whereby called sahibu al-mâl/ rabb al-mâl (investor) and the other called mudarib for the
purpose performing the trade for the profit. This kind of partnership had been known in Madina
as muqarada (qiradh). Saeed, Islamic Banking, p. 51; al-Zuhailî, al-Fiqh al-Islâmî wa ‘Adillatuh
(Damaskus: Dâr al-Fikr),  p. 836.
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profit of the business is calculated. Profit sharing can be defined, but not necessarily,
from the percentage of the partner’s participation in the capital. If there ius a loss, it is
shared between thepartners according to the ratio of their participation in the partnership.
Participation in a partnership can be either with money or with other types of asset such
as illiquidassets. For illiquid assets, then market value for these assets have to be established.
In musyaraka contracts, syariah financial institutions have a right to participate in the
management of business.
Mudaraba is another type of partnership contract between financial institutions
and their counterparts (mudarib). The basic concept of mudaraba is that capital and labor
are treated equally. In mudaraba, syariah financial insttituions have no right to participate
in the management of business. Profit and loss sharing has to be determined in advance.
In the case of loss, syariah financial institutions lose their capital, while the mudarib loses
his time and energy working on the business. Liability from mudaraba contract is limited
to the amount fund supplied to the business, unless some debt are used in the business.
In mudaraba contract, ownership of the assets remains in the hand of syariah financial
institutions. Any appreciation in market value of assets belongs to syariah financial
institutions.
Salam, Ijarah, Istisna, and Murabahah
Salam is practiced and allowed by Holy Prophet to help farmers who needed money
to finance their plants and family. This practice will prevent farmers from borrowing
with usury loans. Salam is a sale in which the seller agrees to supply specific goods to the
buyer at future date, but the price is paid fully at spot (now).11 Hence, the price is cash,
but the good delivery is deferred. In Islamic banking, the buyer (syariah financial institutions)
order the specific goods to the seller and to resell to customer in cash or credit for period of time.
Ijarah is similar to financial lease in conventional banking. In Ijarah, the ownership
of the assets is still on the hand of syariah financial institutions. The usufruct,12 that is
the right to use, is transferred from syariah financial institutions to their counterparties.
The assets are reported in the balance sheet of syariah financial institutions. The transfer
of ownership from lessor (syariah financial institutions) to the lessee (the counterparties)
at the end of contract is not automatic. Syariah financial institutions have to make different
contract to transfer its ownership at the end of contract. Ijara is one of service in syariah
financial institution for the purpose completing  customer need
Istisna’ means “order to manufacture”. In this contract, a party asks another party
11Zuhailî, al-Fiqh al-Islâmî,  p. 598.
12M. Muzaffar, “Ijara: Financing on the Basis of Hire Purchase and Leasing,” in Encyclopaedia
of Islamic Banking and Insurance (London: The Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance,
1988), p. 143.
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(themanufacturer) to manufacture a product that is unavailable in the market, using
materials provided by the manufacturer. The price of Istisna’ can be paid in advance, or
at anytime agreed upon between both parties. It can also be paid in full at the time of deliveryor
in installments at deûned periods.
Murabaha is a type of financing, in which where the bank purchases an asset on
behalf of counterparty. The bank then resells the asset to the counterparty at a predetermined
price that covers the original cost and an added profit margin. Payment is made in the
future in lump sum or in installments. Ownership resides with the syariah financial institutions
until all payments are made.
Financial Risk Management Consequences of Syariah Financing Contracts:
Research Issues
The most ideal types of financing contracts are those based on profit-loss sharing
principles. Thus, musyaraka and mudaraba financing should be the largest proportion of
financing contracts for syariah financial institutions. Interestingly, empirical findings seem
to show that proportion of musyaraka and mudaraba contracts is much less than that of
debt like contracts of murabahah. Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) show that,  in 1995 murabahah
and ijarah contracts constitute more than 50% of all financing contracts in Syariah financial
institutions. Musyaraka and Mudaraba constitute around 25% of the total financing.13
Statistic Islamic Banking in Indonesia show that, murabaha constitutes more than
50 % of mudaraba and musyaraka financing. This fact show us, the implentation of profit
loss sharing face the problem in many countries. This number may change as time is progressing.
However the central message remains: debt-like financing is still more popular than profit-
loss sharing contracts
Table 1
Size of Various Syariah Financing Contracts
In billion IDR
Source: Islamic Banking Statistic, January 2013, Bank Indonesia
Types of 
Contracts  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Murabahah  22.486  26.231  37.508  56.365  70.221 
Ijarah  516  1.305  2.341  3.839  5.459 
Musyaraka  7.411  10.412  14.624  18.960  22.531 
Mudaraba  6.205  6.597  8.631  10.229  10.882 
13Rajesh K. Aggarwal, and Tarik Yousef, “Islamic Banks and Investment Financing,” in Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), p. 103.
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This seems to be a puzzle, why syariah financial institutions avoid the ideal types of
financing contracts. However, this puzzle seems to be easily explained by the undesirable
characterictics of profit-loss sharing contracts. Profit-loss sharing contracts may induce
certain undesirable conditions: moral hazard and adverse selection. These conditions
are well noted in insurance literature. High risk counterparties will find profit-loss sharing
as an optimal way to share their risk with syariah financing institutions (adverse selection).
Prudent counterparties may change their behavior into high risk taking, to take advantage
of the profit-loss sharing contracts (moral hazard). Syariah financial institutions attempt
to manage this risk by providing profit-loss sharing contracts only to few selected counterparties.
Musyaraka and mudaraba will be given only to reputed counterparties and probably with
very strict debt covenant. This situation results in lower proportion of Musyaraka and
mudaraba to the total syariah financing.
Furthermore, Aggarwal and Yousef argue that weaknesses of Musyaraka and
Mudaraba contracts are aggravated by poor contracting environment. More specifically,
Syariah financial institutions operate mostly in countries with poor governance systems.14
Countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, in which syariah institutions operate,
tend to have weaker governance systems. Financial markets in these countries are characterized
by high degrees of imperfect information and rent-seeking behavior. Data for Iran, Pakistan,
and Egypt suggest that these countries have somewhat inefficient bureacracy, and corrupt
economies, and high levels of rent seeking and corruption15.Aggarwal and Yousef  argue
that higher proportions of debt-like financing are an optimal respond by syariah institutions
to the nature of musyaraka and mudaraba and the poor contracting environment.16
Theoretical and Conceptual Discussion
Theoretically Musyaraka and Mudaraba may induce undesirable conditions such
as moral hazard and adverse selection, although these non-debt like financings are the
ideal contracts in Islamic context. Syariah financing rationally tend to avoid these types
of contracts. There seems to be a conflicting incentives: economic and religious incentives.
Religious incentives dictate the use of musyaraka and mudarabah, while economic incentives,
given the nature of musyaraka mudaraba and contracting environment, dictate the use
of debt-like instruments. The questions are how both incentives interact, how to reconcile
both incentives. Aggarwal and Yousef  develop a model to explain why debt-like contracts
are more popular and under what conditions proportion of non-debt like contracts (musyaraka
and mudaraba) should be higher. In their  model, the agency problem between syariah financial
14Ibid., p. 117.
15Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” in Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (August
1995), p. 687, 691, 693, 709.
16Aggarwal and Yousef, “Islamic Banks,” p. 119.
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institutions and their counterparties arises from contractual incompleteness and information
asymmetry between these two parties.17 They show that profit-loss sharing can be optimal
financial contracts even when the contracts are incomplete. However, the optimality decreases
as the level of agency problems increases. The debt-like financial contracts become more
dominant in this situation. Other impliacations emerge from their model. First, debt will
be short term in nature. Hence syariah financial institutions have tendency to lend short-
term. Next, syariah financial institutions prefer to lend to lower cost investment projects.
The use of collateral, although it is not consistent with the spirit of Islam, can be understood
as an effort by Syariah financial institutions to reduce agency problems.
In my opinion, theoretical framework of agency problems, information asymmetry
will be very helpful in explaining current situation faced by Syariah financial institutions
and the evolution of the banks. For example, we can predict that as information asymmetry
is reduced, agency problem will be reduced also, the use of musyaraka and mudaraba will
increase. This prediction has policy implications, for example Syariah financial institutions
should develop ways to reduce information asymmetry, such as developing good debtor
information system, improving qualities of their human resources.
In reality, mudaraba is a financing contract with high risk for suppliers of fund
(syariah financial institutions). This contract assumes that the fund provided by financial
institutions is equal to (worth of) the works of businessman (mudarib). This assumption
implies that financial institutions can not ask for any responsibility from businessman
should businessman fails. Financial institutions are assumed to share business risk. Exceptions
are for business failure from managerial errors, crime, and voluntary mistakes by businessman.
The fund obtained by syariah financial institutions from depositors should be held accountable
to them with all consequences. Traditionally, in Indonesia, depositors and savers for syariah
banks (including mudaraba and musyaraka) expect to gain profit. The truth is that mudaraba
and musyarakah contracts offer both: profit and loss. The possibility of losing is still there
with musyaraka and mudaraba contracts.
However, if this truth is applied to syariah depositors and savers, there will be a danger.
Syariah banks will lose their appeal. Most Indonesian savers and depositors are not ready
to suffer loss in their banking experience. Thus, we have a challenge how to change behavior
and attitude of syariah depositors and savers, from expecting sure profit to expecting
both profit and loss. Demand for profit from syariah depositors and savers drives syariah
bank to demand sure profit for their investment. This situation logically leads to the popularity
of murabahah (trade financing) in syariah banking, since murabahah contracts offer fixed
income, which  is similar to loan contracts from traditional banks. This situation also forces
syariah banks to become conservative and put heavy restriction on their financing contracts.
The issue of information asymmetry becomes crucial in management of mudaraba
17Ibid., p. 95.
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financing contracts. Management of mudaraba projects is left fully to businessman,
who will probably have different risk preference from syariah banks. Businessman (mudarib)
tend to be more aggressive, be willing to take higher risks, to gain higher profit. On the
contrary, syariah banks tend to be more conservative, avoid risky projects. Businessman
tends to have better information about the projects than syariah banks. This situation
creates information asymmetry between mudarib and syariah banks. Trust between
mudarib and syariah banks becomes very important. The concept of trust in this contract
should be redefined, so that trust can be expected to reduce information asymmetry between
mudarib and syariah banks.
Honesty among businessman in Islam countries is generally viewed as low. Ironically,
mudaraba and musyaraka contracts require high degree of trust and honesty. The low
level of honesty creates higher monitoring cost for syariah banks.18 Syariah banks become
inefficient from the process of monitoring their debtors. The low level of honesty can be
understood, since the management of the projects is left solely to mudârib (businessman).
Professionally, a trust is a part of evaluation by syariah banks implicitly (not explicitly
appears on the contracts). If the trust is an important part in designing syariah contracts,
the the trust should be explicitly appeared in the syariah contracts. Low level of honesty
is still a significant impediment to spreading syariah contracts among syariah banks. Inability
to treat (or to include) trust properly into syariah contracts exaggerate the problems. Thus
we see that most financing portfolios of syariah banks are dominated by non-profit loss
sharing contracts. Thus, syariah banks do not yet reflect the essence of the spirit of syariah.19
It seems that discussion on syariah banks relates closely with Islamic economy as a
whole. Islamic economy regulates not only the economic system, but also emphasizes
behavioral aspects as a balance between material and spiritual needs. Truth or honesty
aspects can be expected to minimize information asymmetry and agency conflicts between
syariah banks and their debtors. This approach is somewhat different from traditional
banking approach. Traditional banks use bonding and monitoring mechanisms to reduce
information asymmetryand agency conflicts, while syariah banks can use honesty as
additional mechanism to reduce information asymmetryand agency conflicts. Honesty
is a basic religious attitude for all aspects of life, including business aspects.
Febianto  analyzes more specific risks faced by syariah financial institutions. In
general, syariah financial institutions face the same risks as those faced by conventional
financial institutions. Thus syariah financial institutions face credit risk, market risk,
liquidity risk, rate of return risk, operational risk. Febainto  also points out mismatch between
18Sami Hammoud, Islamic Banking (London: Arabian Information, Ltd, 1986) in Saeed,
Islamic Banking, p. 70-71.
19Ascarya and Diana Yumanita, Bank Syariah: Gambaran Umum (Jakarta: PPSK BI, 2005),
p. 62.
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the left side and the right side balance sheet of Syariah financial institutions. On the right
side (funding side), depositors tend to choose debt-like contracts, such as murabaha, while
on the left side, there is a pressure for Syariah financial institutions to lend in the form of
non-debt like contracts (such as musyaraka and murabahah).20 This kind of mismatch
increases the risk of syariah financial institutions. Boumediene analyzes more specific risk,
which is credit risk, in every syariah financial contracts. In general, all syariah financial
contracts contain credit risk in various degree. The discussion seems to suggest that the
credit risk of syariah financial institutions is higher than that of conventional financial
institutions.21
Empirical Discussion
Various papers discuss risk and risk management faced by syariah financial institutions.
Boumediene  investigates whether credit risk faced by syariah financial institutions is
higher than that of conventional financial institutions. Rather than using conventional
credit risk measures, such as non-performing loan, loan loss provision, Boumediene
uses option pricing framework of Merton  to measure credit risk. The following formula
is used to measure distance to default (DD), which is later translated to probability of
default. The higher probability default, the higher credit risk.22
.......................................... (1)
The variables used are explained in the following table.
20Irawan Febianto, “Adapting Risk Management for Profit and Loss Sharing Financing of
Islamic Banks,” in Modern Economy 3 (January 2012), p. 74.
21Aniss Boumediene, “Is Credit Risk Really Higher in Islamic Banks?,” in The Journal of
Credit Risk, Vol. VII, No. 3, (Fall 2011), p. 110.
22Ibid., p. 111.
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Table 2
Variables Used ro Calculate Default Probability
Source: Aniss Boumediene, Is credit risk really higher in Islamic banks? The Journal of
Credit Risk (97–129) Volume 7/Number 3, Fall 2011, p.115.
Using nine Syariah banks and nine conventional banks mostly in middle-east
countries, and using data from 2005 to 2009, Boumediene finds that Syariah banks have
higher Distance to Default (DD) and lower probability of default, as shown in the following
table. The difference is statistically significant at 10% significance level.23
Table 3
Distance to Default and Default Probability for Syariah
Source: Aniss Boumediene, Is credit risk really higher in Islamic banks? The Journal of Credit
Risk (97–129) Volume 7/Number 3, Fall 2011, p.119.
This result seems to indicate that Syariah financial institutions are successful in
managing risks. The other side of the coin from this finding is that Syariah financial
institutions are able to manage risk by avoiding profit-loss sharing contracts, the contracts
that have high inherent risks explained above. This research indicates that profit loss
sharing contracts tend to have high agency conflicts. This situation leads in syariah banks
avoiding profit loss sharing contracts. Syariah banks tend to offer more certain contracts
such as murabahah than profit loss sharing contracts.
23Ibid., p. 119.
 Conventional banks Islamic banks 
E (equity) Number of shares outstanding x price of the share 
at the beginning of each year 
Idem 
D (debt) Total liabilities (extracted from balance sheet 
statements) 
Total liabilities: 
PLS accounts 
σE  (equity 
volatility) 
Historical volatility (standard deviation of share 
price returns) for each year, annualized  
Idem 
T Maturity of one year Idem 
μV Rate of growth of assets per annum Idem 
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Tafri, Rahman, and Omar use survey method to investigate risk management practices
for syariah and conventional financial institutions in Malaysia and selected Islamic banks
outside Malaysia. They distributea set of questionnaire to the banks in the sample. They
find that there are significant differences in the level of extensiveness of financial risk
management practices in syariah and conventional financial institutions. Syariah financial
institutions tend to practice financial risk management less extensively than do conventional
financial institutions. More specifically, the usage of market value at risk (VaR),24 stress
testing results, credit risk mitigation methods, and also thelevel of extensiveness of the
usage of operational risk management tools between Islamic andconventional banks is
different. They conclude that risk management tools and systems for syariah financial
institutions are inadequate, particularly in the critical areas of “IT professionals in risk
management. They believe that innovations and product developments are needed for
Islamic banking in managing risks.25 Risks in syariah banks are more complex than those
in conventional banks. One of the reason is that syariah banks offer more product variations
as a consequence of high variation of akad, either from funding and financing aspects of
syariah banks. The more complex risks certainly need a more complex management, and
probably individualistic or tailor made approaches that are more consistent with the
characteristics of each product.
Although the following papers do not directly discuss the financial risk management,
I would like to discuss these papers. Their findings are of interest to understanding the
dynamic of syariah financial institutions. Chong and Liu  study Malaysian Syariah Banks.
Conceptually, Islamic banks should operate using principle of profit-loss sharing, which
should be independent of interest rate movement. However their findings seem to suggest
that Islamic banks deviate substantially from the principle of profit-loss sharing. They
find that the development of profit-loss sharing on the asset side tends to be slow than
that of the liability side. On the asset side, only 0.5% ofIslamic bank financing is based on
the PLS paradigm of mudaraba (profit-sharing) and musyaraka(joint venture) financing.
On the liability side, however, mudaraba(profit-sharing) deposits, which account for 70%
of total Islamic deposits, are more predominant.26 They also find that the investment rates
on Islamic deposits are mostly lower and less volatile than that of conventional deposits.
This finding is in contast to our expectation. Given the profit-loss sharing scheme for deposit,
we can expect to have more volatile rate of return for profit-loss sharing than that for
conventional interest rate.
24Fauziah Hanim Tafri, Rashidah Abdul Rahman and Normah Omar, “Empirical Evidence
on the Risk Management Tools Practised in Islamic and Conventional Banks,” in Qualitative
Research in Financial Markets, Vol. III, No. 2, 2011, p. 86-104, p. 100.
25Ibid., p. 103.
26Beng Soon Chong, Ming-Hua Liu, “Islamic Banking: Interest-Free or Interest-Based?,”
in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17 (2009), p. 125–144.
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Using the Engle–Granger error-correction model,they show that (a) changes
inconventional deposit rates cause changes in Islamic investment rates, but not vice
versa, (b) theIslamic investment rates are positively related to conventional deposit rates
in the long-term, and (c) when the Islamic investment rates deviate far above (below)
the conventional deposit rates,they will adjust downwards (upwards) towards the long-
term equilibrium level. Those resultsSeem to indicate that the profit-losss sharing in Syariah
banking is actually closely tied to the deposit interest rate in conventional banking. Finally
the authors question the benefit of profit-loss sharing. The widespread of syariah financial
institutions seems to be driven by the widespread of Islamic movement, rather than the
economic benefit of profit-loss sharing.
Hutapea and Kasri  find that there exists a long-running relationship between the
Islamic Bank Marginand its determinants, especially interest rate volatility. In particular,
there is negative relationship between interest rate volatility and Islamic ban margin.27
This result suggests that Syariah financial institutions should pay close attention to volatility
of interest rate. In another interpretation, performance of Islamic banks depend on interest
rate or, in this case, the volatility of interest rate.
Conclusion
I attempt to review literature on the financial risk management of Syariah financial
institutions. This dicussion is closely related to the discussion of the characteristics of
syariah financial contracts, which are largely based on profit-loss sharing.The uniqueness
of profit-loss sharing brings about several consequences.
First, the economic benefits of profit-loss sharing is still controversial. Traditional
literature in syariah financing defends this type of contract based more on religious belief.
However, economic incentive seems to exist along with religious incentive. Thus future
research should provide economic justification for profit-loss sharing contracts. Second,
from syariah financial institutions point of view, profit-loss sharing contracts are highly
vulnerable to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. This condition stems from
the information asymmetry and agency conflict embedded inherently in profit-loss sharing
contract. I believe that framework of agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1974) and
information asymmetry has promising potential to understand the dynamic of syariah
financial institutions. Third, aside from theoretical and conceptual discussion, I believe
that one of promising research area in the future is finding the optimal and more practical
ways for syariah institutions to bring profit-loss sharing contracts into syariah financing
reality. So far, Syariah institutions have great difficulties in implementing pure profit-loss
27Erwin G. Hutapea and Rahmatina A. Kasri, “Bank Margin Determination: a Comparison
Between Islamic and Conventional Banks in Indonesia,” in International Journal of Islamic
and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, Vol. III, No. 1, 2010, p. 78.
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sharing contracts. Overall I believe that syariah financing contracts still provide promising
future research, especially in the financial  risk management issues for the contracts.
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